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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

Case No. 20020590-CA

EDWIN BIRDHAND LEHI,
Defendant/Appellant
ARGUMENT
L
WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEA
IS REQUIRED BY THE PROSECUTOR'S
BREACH OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT.
The State posits that the prosecutor technically did not breach the plea
agreement by recommending to the Board of Pardons and Paroles that Lehi be
incarcerated for a minimum of two and a half years, because the plea agreement
necessarily contemplated only a recommendation to the trial court, because it
specified a recommendation for jail time, something which only the trial court,
and not the Board of Pardons, could order. State's brief at 16.
The State's argument that the plea agreement necessarily bound the
prosecutor's recommendation only to the trial court because the Board of
Pardons had no authority to order a jail sentence overlooks the transcript of the
plea hearing, which reflects Lehi's, trial counsel's, and the prosecutor's
understanding and agreement, that the prosecutor would recommend no further
1

prison time. See R. 108 at 4-6, in the Addendum to this brief.
As defense counsel explained to the trial court,
Your Honor, Mr. Lehi - this will be a change of plea. He's
pleading guilty to the Third Degree Felony and, urn, in exchange for
that plea the State has agreed to recommend that he only serve 90
days in the, ah, San Juan County Jail. And also there is a - he's
been doing some time in - ah, on some charges out of Blanding.
And he's been - he had 68 days that he had to serve out of
Blanding. He has 27 days left and the State has agreed that he
could, ah, serve those days, urn - ah concurrent. So, ah, that's the
situation.
One of the reasons for this recommendation is this: Is Mr. Lehi
was arrested back, ah - back whenever this charge first came up,
and, urn, ah, in the mean time, ah, before he could get to trial, he
was arrested for DUI over in, ah - over in New Mexico. So the
consequence of that DUI - and that - and that was a DUI that he
picked up while this matter was pending, and the State wasn't happy
about that. But he did time in prison, as a result of that DUI, and
he's presently on parole from - to the State of New Mexico. So part
of our plea negotiation was just something that Mr. Lehi has already
done prison time, ah, as a - as a consequence of having a DUI.
He's on parole right now and he should be given the
opportunity to prove himself that he's, ah, been able to rehabilitate
himself and, ah - and also while he's on parole to another state. So
the State did still want a felony on him and so he's pleaded to the
felony. But they have agreed that he wouldn't have to do any
additional prison time or not to recommend any additional prison
time. And as a part of the plea bargain, it says in there that, urn that he continue with his New Mexico pa- - ah, parole.
(R. 108 at 4-5)(Emphasis added).
The prosecutor's letter to the Board of Pardons recommending that Lehi
be imprisoned for a minimum of two and half years obviously violated the plea
agreement and requires withdrawal of the plea. See, e.g.. State v. Copeland.
765 P.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Utah 1988).
2

Even if the record did not expressly reflect that the prosecutor agreed not
to recommend prison time, many courts have recognized that mere technical
compliance with a plea agreement which realistically violates the spirit of the plea
agreement constitutes a breach of the agreement. See, e.g.. State v. Blackwell.
522 S.E.2d 313, 315 (N.C. App. 1999).
In Blackwell. the prosecution used the defendant's prior offenses
derivatively to prove other offenses underlying a charge of felony murder, after
having agreed in a plea bargain not to use those other offenses directly in
prosecuting the felony murder charge. On appeal, the defendant claimed a
breach of the plea agreement, and the court agreed, stating,
Even though a plea agreement arises in the context of a
criminal proceeding, it remains in essence a contract. State v.
Rodriguez, 111 N.C.App. 141, 144, 431 S.E.2d 788, 790 (1993).
However, it is markedly different from an ordinary commercial
contract. By pleading guilty, a defendant waives many constitutional
rights, not the least of which is his right to a jury trial. State v. Pait,
81 N.CApp. 286, 289, 343 S.E.2d 573, 576 (1986). "No other right
of the individual has been so zealously guarded over the years and
so deeply embedded in our system of jurisprudence as an accused's
right to a jury trial." State v. Boone, 293 N.C. 702, 712, 239 S.E.2d
459, 465 (1977). As such, due process mandates strict adherence to
any plea agreement. Rodriguez, 111 N.CApp. at 145, 431 S.E.2d at
790. Moreover, this strict adherence "require[s] holding the [State] to
a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant (or possibly
than would be either of the parties to commercial contracts) for
imprecisions or ambiguities in plea agreements." United States v.
Harvey, 791 F.2d 294, 300 (4th Cir.1986).
Blackwell at 731.
The court rejected the government's suggestion that the defendant should
3

have specified that the government could not use the prior offenses derivatively
in the plea agreement, stating,
The State suggests that defendant should have bargained for this
interpretation. But defendant should not be forced to anticipate
loopholes that the State might create in its own promises. Using
defendant's guilty plea to felonious impaired driving to prove the
underlying felony of assault is no less a violation of the plea
agreement than if the State had just gone ahead and introduced
evidence of the felonious impaired driving. Here, the State used
defendant's plea as the same proof. Thus, even if the State did not
violate the express terms of the plea agreement, it did violate the
spirit of that agreement. Cf. State v. Sodders, 130 Ariz. 23, 633 P.2d
432, 438 (Ct.App.1981) ("A breach of a plea agreement occurs not
only when the prosecution breaks its promise, but also when the
spirit of the inducement is breached."); Van Buskirk v. State, 102
Nev. 241, 720 P.2d 1215,1216 (1986) ("The violation of the terms or
'the spirit' of the plea bargain requires reversal."). We therefore hold
that the State violated defendant's plea agreement.
Biackweii at 731-732.
Likewise in the instant case, Lehi entered his guilty plea with the
understanding that the prosecutor would recommend no further prison, but ninety
days in jail, concurrent with Lehi's Blanding sentence, and continued New
Mexico Parole (R. 93-95; R. 108 at 4-6). It is not reasonable to suggest that
Lehi, a lay person, or even defense counsel should have anticipated that this
plea agreement meant that the day after the prosecutor recommended the
sentence contemplated by the plea agreement, he would turn around the very
next day and recommend Lehi's imprisonment for a minimum of two and half
years. His recommendation to the Board of Pardons violated the spirit of the
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plea bargain and should be viewed as a breach. See, e.g.. Blackwell, supra.
As Lehi's plea affidavit confirms, he was induced to enter his plea by his
understanding that the prosecutor would make this ifvnmiiiriiilHtif ,i, (I' ' r.-i 9 r ).
The State cites State v. Garfield. 552 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah 1976), for the
following proposition:
"Where a defendant is aware there is no guarantee the court will
agree to follow the recommendation of the prosecutor," as was the
case here, "There is no reason to set aside a plea of guilty."
State's brief at 18.
While the State's qui >i alio'i of Garfield is ao",in -al'v MM1 <"< ni'1 ';|ii«ii<i lead
the Garfield opinion and confirm that the Garfield actually supports Lehi's
position that if the prosecutor failed to comply with his plea agreement to
recommend no further prison time, Lehi

his plea.

In Garfield, the defendant claimed that the prosecutor failed to make a
sentencing recommendation which induced his plea. While the court did make
the statement quoted in IIn1 '• hie ' hnot this statement was dictum lm II le i
remanded the matter to the trial court to determine whether the prosecutor
conveyed the sentencing recommendation contemplated in the plea agreement.
The Garfield opinion slalfi:,
The record clearly establishes defendant understood the court was
not bound by any recommendation of the prosecutor. Where a
defendant is aware there is no guarantee the court will agree to
follow the recommendation of the prosecutor, there is no reason to
set aside a plea of quilty. Furthermore, a mere subjective belief of a
5

I

defendant as to potential sentence, or hope of leniency, unsupported
by any promise from the prosecutor or indication by the court, is
insufficient to invalidate a guilty plea as involuntary or unknowing.
This cause is remanded to determine if the sentencing judge
were informed of the prosecutor's recommendation. If it be
established that such a recommendation were before the court, the
prosecutor has fulfilled his promise, and the judgment is affirmed.
Id. at 131. See ajso State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Utah
1988)(explaining that in Garfield, the court "held that if [the bargained for
recommendation] had not been included, "the defendant was 'entitled to have his
sentence set aside and to be resentenced with the benefit of his bargain.'").
Utah case law, like federal case law, has long recognized that if a
sentencing recommendation induces a defendant to plead guilty, and the
prosecutor fails to make the recommendation, withdrawal of the plea is in order,
regardless of the influence of the prosecutor's conduct on the sentencing court.
See, e.g.. State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266,1275-76 (Utah 1988)(quoting
Santobellov. New York. 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971), for the proposition that "'[A]
constant factor is that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement
or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.'").
Because the prosecutor's letter to the Board of Pardons violated the letter
and the spirit of the plea agreement, withdrawal of the plea is in order. See, e.g..
Copeland; Blackwell. supra.

6

THE RECORD DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE
THAT LEHI UNDERSTOOD THE NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF
THE OFFENSE TO WHICH HE PLED GUILTY.
The State argues that Lehi was aware of the elements of his offense,
because his plea affidavit so indicated, and also stated that he had received a
copy of the Amended Information, read il m 11< n I il n:i;nl In linn 'itdle s hnel it
9-10.
The State is correct in noting that in assessing compliance with rule 11,
Courts

ddition to the

plea affidavit and colloquy. See State's brief at 7, citing State v. Maquire, 830
P.2d 216, 218 (Utah 1991); and State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88,<| 11 22 P.3d 1242.
However, the |>K-i illi'ldvil wlii'ili supposedly reflected Lei" •
understanding of the nature and elements of the offense did not identify or define
the information as the source of the legal elements, and there is nothing in the
record reflectimi IIhit I tin ,i Uy peison knew IIMI IIIU information stated the
elements of the offense to which Lehi pled.
More importantly, the plea affidavit itself purported to reflect Lehi's
understanding of the legal elements, stating,
The elements of the crime to which I am pleading guilty (or no
contest) are: ACTUAL PHYSICAL CONTROL OF A VEHICLE
W/ BAC OF .08 OR GREATER W/ 2 OR MORE PRIOR DUI'S W/l 6
YFARS
(R.34).
7

Because there was no chemical test in this case (R. 106 at 19), and thus
no way for the prosecution to prove or Lehi to admit to a "BAC of .08 or greater,"
the plea affidavit shows that Lehi misunderstood the elements of the offense to
which he pled.
The trial court never corrected the erroneous elements in the affidavit, nor
clarified the correct legal elements for Lehi, demonstrating a failure to strictly
comply with Rule 11, and the constitutional law requiring trial courts to establish
the defendant's understanding of the legal and factual bases for a guilty plea.
See Opening Brief of Appellant, Point I.
Because the trial court did not clarify or correct the plea affidavit, the plea
was not taken in compliance with Rule 11 or the governing constitutional law.
See, e.g.. State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470, 476-77 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 836
P.2d 1383 (Utah 1992).
In Smith, the Court carefully explained how this Court will review plea
colloquies in conjunction with plea affidavits to assess compliance with Rule 11,
and directed the trial courts to go beyond insuring that defendants have read and
understand the affidavits and signed them voluntarily, stating,
The inquiry cannot stop there, however. State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d
1332 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (per curiam) (incomplete affidavit coupled
with inquiry only into understanding and voluntariness fails to meet
Gibbons Rule 11 requirements). Any omissions or ambiguities in the
affidavit must be clarified during the plea hearing, as must any
uncertainties raised in the course of the plea colloquy.
8

Smith at 477.
The Smith Court implicitly recognized that when errors in plea affidavits go
unaddressed by trial courts, the entry of the pleas is incorrect, by stating the
converse proposition:
A Rule 11 deficiency in the affidavit will not, however, render the
plea invalid where incomplete or missing information in the affidavit
is supplied in the plea colloquy when the defendant enters the plea.
Smith at 477.
While the affidavit and colloquy in Smith both correctly stated the legal
elements, in the instant matter, the affidavit misstated the legal elements, and the
trial court did nothing to correct the error. Accordingly, the plea was not taken in
compliance with Rule 11. Cf. id. See also State v. Valencia. 776 P.2d 1332,
1335 (Utah App. 1989)(when trial court did not establish elements and factual
basis for plea during colloquy, but relied on affidavit which was deficient in this
regard, these facts mandated the withdrawal of the plea).

The State argues

that Lehi understood the elements of the offense to which he pled, because the
two alternative means of proving DUI, by proving either a BAC of .08 or greater,
or by proving that the driver was under the influence to a degree rendering him
incapable of driving safely, are "conceptually identical" means of proving the
offense of DUI. State's brief at 10, citing State v. Bratthauer. 354 N.W. 2d 774,
776 (Iowa 1984); and Murray City v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314,1319 (Utah 1983).

9

The Bratthauer court did not address elements or factual basis in the
context of a motion to withdraw a plea, but found that the trial court did not err in
requiring a jury to reach a unanimous verdict under subsections (a) and (b), after
explaining that subsection (b) reflected a legislative presumption that someone
was under the influence if they had that level of alcohol in their body. 354
N.W.2d at 777.
Bratthauer is further inapposite, because the Iowa DUI statute does not
have the same alternative means of proving DUI that the Utah statute currently
has, but instead provides,
1) A person shall not operate a motor vehicle upon the public
highways of this state in either of the following conditions:
(a) While under the influence of an alcoholic
beverage, a narcotic, hypnotic, or other drug, or any
combination of such substances.
(b) While having thirteen hundredths or more of
one percent by weight of alcohol in the blood.
(2) A person convicted of a violation of this section, upon
conviction or a plea of guilty, is guilty of:
(c) A class "D" felony for a third offense and each
subsequent offense
(3) A person shall not be convicted and sentenced for
violations of both paragraphs "a" and "b" of subsection 1 if the
offenses were committed in the same occurrence

idMurray City v. Hall. 663 P.2d 1314, 1319 (Utah 1983), is likewise
inapposite, because it did not discuss the legal elements of an offense in the
context of a motion to withdraw a plea, but instead involved judicial interpretation
10

of statutes and ordinances in the context of an equal protection challenge to
ordinances under which the defendant was convicted. See id.
Hall is further removed from this case, because it involved ordinances and
outdated statutes which are not in effect in Lehi's case. The statutes and
ordinance in effect in Hall defined presumptions for DUI cases, presuming that if
a BAC was below .05, the person was not under the influence, that if a BAC was
between .05 and .08, the person was presumed under the influence, but could
rebut this presumption with other evidence, and that if a BAC was over .10, the
person was presumed under the influence and could not rebut this presumption
with other evidence.
Thus, neither Bratthauer nor Hall establishes that the two means of proving
DUI, by a BAC of .08 or greater, or by proof that the driver was under the
influence to a degree rendering him incapable of driving safely, are conceptually
identical.
Hurst v. Cook. 777 P.2d 1029,1038 (Utah 1989), cited on page 11 of the
State's brief, does not stand for the proposition that a defendant's guilty plea
may be entered absent a record that he understood the facts and elements of the
offense to which he pled. Rather, it involved a habeas petitioner's contention
that it was unlawful to allow him to plead guilty to a lesser offense than was
charged in order to obtain a lesser sentence, when it was factually impossible for
him to have committed the offense to which he pled. See id. The opinion
11

reasoned that the entry of such a plea was lawful because the crime to which the
petitioner pled was sufficiently similar to the offense charged to insure that his
criminal history would accurately reflect the general nature of his criminal
conduct, and because the defendant got the result he bargained for. See id.
Hurst is thus inapposite to and does not control Lehi's contention that the
record does not establish that he understood the elements and factual basis for
the plea. Cf. id.
By reviewing the plain language of 41-6-44 applicable on the relevant date,
August 25, 2000, this Court can readily confirm that the DUI statute does not set
forth two conceptually identical versions of DUI, but rather, sets forth two very
different means of proving DUI. The statute then provided,

(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a
vehicle within this state if the person:
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a
chemical test given within two hours of the
alleged operation or physical control shows
that the person has a blood or breath
alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater; or (ii) is under the influence of
alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a
degree that renders the person incapable
of safely operating a vehicle
See also Harry v. Schwendiman, 740 P.2d 1344,1346 and n.1 (Utah App.
1987)(driver's license division acted improperly in suspending driver's license for
DUI, in absence of evidence that driver either had a BAC of .08 or greater, or
12

evidence that the driver was under the influence to a degree rendering him
incapable of driving safely).
Because the plea affidavit misstated the legal elements of Lehi's offense,
and because the trial court did not correct or clarify the elements, the withdrawal
of Lehi's plea is mandatory. See Smith and Valencia, supra.

ill

THE RECORD DOES NOT DEMONSTRATE
THAT LEHI UNDERSTOOD THE FACTUAL BASIS FOR
OR NATURE OF THE OFFENSE TO WHICH HE PLED GUILTY.
The State's discussion of the factual basis for Lehi's plea focuses
exclusively on evidence from the preliminary hearing reflecting that Lehi was
under the influence to a degree rendering him unable to drive safely, and makes
no mention of any evidence that Lehi had a BAC of .08 or greater, see State's
brief at 12-13, as Lehi's plea affidavit, quoted supra, would have required.
The State argues that the facts established at the preliminary hearing
reflect that Lehi understood the factual basis for his plea. State's brief at 11-13.
Assuming that the preliminary hearing transcript furnishes a factual basis,
the plea affidavit does not demonstrate that Lehi, a lay person, understood the
facts established at the preliminary hearing were the legal basis for his plea.
Rather, the affidavit which was written to reflect his understanding of the factual
basis states,
These facts provide a basis for the court to accept
my guilty pleas and prove the elements of the crime(s)
13

to which I am pleading guilty:
I WAS DRIVING MY CAR
I HAD BEEN DRINKING
I HAVE TWO PRIOR DUIS W/l LAST 6 YEARS
(R. 34).
Assuming that the affidavit is fairly read as indicating that Lehi had been
driving his car after he had been drinking alcohol, these facts do not amount to
DUI, because it is legal to drive after drinking in this State unless one has the
requisite BAC or is incapable of driving safely. Thus, the plea affidavit, which
was not clarified or corrected by the trial court, reflects that Lehi misunderstood
the facts essential to a valid plea to DUI, and misunderstood the nature of the
offense to which he pled guilty. But see Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
11(e)(4)(A)(requiring courts to insure that the defendant understands both the
elements and nature of an offense); State v. Ostler. 2000 UT App 28, 996 P.2d
1065, afTd, 2001 UT 68, 31 P.3d 529.1

In Ostler, the Court explained,
If a defendant does "not understand the nature and elements of the
crime to which he pled guilty," his guilty plea is involuntarily made.
Breckenridqe. 688 P.2d at 443-44. '"Because a guilty plea is an
admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot
be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding
of the law in relation to the facts.'" Id. at 444 (alteration in original)
(quoting McCarthy v. United States. 394 U.S. 459, 466, 89 S. Ct.
1166, 1171, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418 (1969) (footnote omitted)).
Additionally, a defendant's "understanding of the elements of the
charges and the relationship of the law and the facts may not be
presumed from a silent or incomplete examination." Valencia. 776
P.2d at 1335. Accordingly, a trial court's "failure to inform a
14

Because the trial court did not correct the plea affidavit's reflection of
Lehi's misunderstanding of the factual nature of the offense to which he pled
guilty, withdrawal of Lehi's plea is mandatory. See Smith; Valencia, supra.
Conclusion
This Court should reverse the trial court's order denying Lehi's motion to
withdraw his plea and remand this matter for trial.
DATED this

^

day of ^tinnaMK-

. 2003.

P**'s hM M w)
KRISTINE M. ROGERS
Counsel for Mr. Lehi

defendant of the nature and elements of the offense is fatal to a
guilty plea conviction." Pharris. 798 P.2d at 777.
Ostler at 2000 UT App at f 14; 996 P.2d 1069-1070.
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ADDENDUM

10:10 A.M.
7TH JANUARY 2002
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT:

Edwin Birdhand Lehi, Case 0017-85.

Let!s see if he's in there, Your Honor.

BAILIFF:

We had him once and then he needed to —
(Mr. Lehi entered courtroom.)
MR. SCHULTZ:
a concurrent.
27 left.

The State would recommend that you do

You have 68 days to do at Blanding.

Okay.

And they're gonna let you be concurrent.

MR. LEHI:

(Inaudible).

MR. SCHULTZ:
MR. LEHI:

Okay?

Yeah.

(Inaudible).

one we were talkin1 about —
MR. SCHULTZ:
we'll talk about that.
about that.

You've got

I want to do that

(Inaudible) — defer.

Defer those to a separate issue and
I'll ask him.

I haven't forgotten

But I just want to you know that they are gonna

recommend concurrent.
MR. LEHI:

All right.

DEFENSE OPENING STATEMENT
BY MR. SCHULTZ:
be a change of plea.

Your Honor, Mr. Lehi —

this will

He's pleading guilty to the Third Degree

Felony and, urn, in exchange for that plea the State has agreed
to recommend that he only serve 90 days in the, ah, San Juan
County Jail.
in —

And also there is a —

he's been doing some time

ah, on some charges out of Blanding.
J. M. LIDDELL
OFFICIAL REPORTER

And he's been —

he had 68 days that he had to serve out of Blanding.

He has

27 days left and the State has agreed that he could, ah, serve
those days, urn —

ah, concurrent.

So, ah, that's the

situation.
One of the reasons for this recommendation is this:
Is Mr. Lehi was arrested back, ah —

back whenever this charge

first came up, and, urn, ah, in the mean time, ah, before he
could get to trial, he was arrested for a DUI over in, ah —
over in New Mexico.
that —

So the consequence of that DUI — and

and that was a DUI that he picked up while this matter

was pending, and the State wasn't happy about that.

But he

did time in prison, as a result of that DUI, and he's
presently on parole from —

to the State of New Mexico.

So

part of our plea negotiation was just something that Mr. Lehi
has already done prison time, ah, as a —

as a consequence of

having a DUI.
He's on parole right now and he should be given the
opportunity to prove himself that he's, -ah, been able to
rehabilitate himself and, ah —
to another state.

and also while he's on parole

So the State did still want a felony on him

and so he's pleaded to the felony.

But they have agreed that

he wouldn't have to do any additional prison time or not to
recommend any additional prison time.

And as a part of the

plea bargain, it says in there that, urn —
with his New Mexico pa- —

ah, parole.
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that he continue

